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Partisans without Constraint: Political






Public opinion polarization is here conceived as a process of align-
ment along multiple lines of potential disagreement and measured
as growing constraint in individuals’ preferences. Using NES data
from 1972 to 2004, the authors model trends in issue partisanship—
the correlation of issue attitudes with party identification—and issue
alignment—the correlation between pairs of issues—and find a sub-
stantive increase in issue partisanship, but little evidence of issue
alignment. The findings suggest that opinion changes correspond
more to a resorting of party labels among voters than to greater
constraint on issue attitudes: since parties are more polarized, they
are now better at sorting individuals along ideological lines. Levels
of constraint vary across population subgroups: strong partisans and
wealthier and politically sophisticated voters have grown more co-
herent in their beliefs. The authors discuss the consequences of par-
tisan realignment and group sorting on the political process and
potential deviations from the classic pluralistic account of American
politics.
INTRODUCTION
According to theorists of political pluralism (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961;
Lowi 1969; Walker 1991; see also Galston 2002; Starr 2007) as well as
1 We thank Peter Bearman, Mario Diani, Aleks Jakulin, Shigeo Hirano, Michael Hout,
Arthur Stinchcombe, Robert Shapiro, Yu-Sung Su, the AJS reviewers, and the par-
ticipants in the Quantitative Political Science workshop at Columbia University for
helpful comments. We also thank the Applied Statistics Center and the Institute of
Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University, the National Science
Foundation, and the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies for
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many scholars who have studied the structural characteristics of con-
temporary societies (Simmel [1908] 1955; Coser 1956; Lipset, Trow, and
Coleman 1956; Lipset 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Blau 1974; Blau
and Schwartz 1984), an integrated society is not a society in which conflict
is absent, but rather one in which conflict expresses itself through non-
encompassing interests and identities. In open societies, “segmental par-
ticipation in a multiplicity of conflicts constitutes a balancing mechanism
within the structure” (Coser 1956, p. 154): intrasocial conflict is sustainable
as long as there are multiple and nonoverlapping lines of disagreement.
In the attempt to propose a pragmatic alternative to both the ideal of
direct, popular democracy and the belief that American politics is gov-
erned by a small, unitary power elite (Mills [1956] 1970; Domhoff 1978),
pluralism scholars recognize that, in practice, representative democracies
do not support the ideal of equal representation. Nonetheless, these schol-
ars maintain that a multitude of interest groups, not a close circle, have
access to power. Intergroup competition, as well as institutional differ-
entiation, limits the influence of single actors, thus securing the openness
of the democratic process.2 At the same time, crosscutting interests inhibit
the emergence of encompassing identities, because members’ allegiance
is often spread among many groups, thus diminishing the possibility of
overt conflict.
Political polarization constitutes a threat to the extent that it induces
alignment along multiple lines of potential conflict and organizes indi-
viduals and groups around exclusive identities, thus crystallizing interests
into opposite factions. In this perspective, opinion alignment, rather than
opinion radicalization, is the aspect of polarization that is more likely to
have consequences on social integration and political stability. From a
substantive viewpoint, if people aligned along multiple, potentially di-
visive issues, even if they did not take extreme positions on each of them,
the end result would be a polarized society. Analytically, it can be shown
that people’s ideological distance and, thus, polarization depend not only
on the level of radicalization of their opinions but also on the extent to
which such opinions are correlated with each other—their constraint, in
the language of Converse (1964). Nonetheless, the study of public opinion
polarization has been mostly oriented to capture the radicalization of
people’s attitudes on single issues (looking at the variation of responses
on an individual issue in the population, where more variation corre-
sponds to more people on the extremes and fewer in the middle), while
financial support. Direct correspondence to Delia Baldassarri, Department of Sociology,
Princeton University, 147 Wallace Hall, Princeton, New Jersey 08544. E-mail:
dbalda@princeton.edu
2 As argued, e.g., by James Madison in number 10 of the Federalist Papers (Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay [1787] 1961).
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questions concerning the coherence of people’s opinions across issues have
generally been overlooked. In contrast, in this article we focus on the
level of attitude constraint and trace time trends in issue partisanship and
issue alignment in the population as a whole and within population
subgroups.
According to the political pluralism model, democratic systems are char-
acterized by crosscutting interests and identities and actual (if not equal)
access to political representation for most (if not all) social groups. Results
from our analysis will be used to evaluate potential deviations from this
model due to alignments of interests that might sharpen divisions in the
political arena and group or partisan sorting that might lead to the sys-
tematic underrepresentation (or even exclusion) of certain groups (and
related interests) from the political process.3 In so doing, we connect the
debate on political polarization to broader dynamics of interest represen-
tation and political integration.
There is virtually full agreement among scholars that political parties
and politicians, in recent decades, have become more ideological and more
likely to take extreme positions on a broad set of political issues (McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Though many observers have concluded that
a similar polarization process has extended to public opinion at large,
scholars have shown that, over the last 40 years, American public opinion
has remained stable or even become more moderate on a large set of
political issues, while people have assumed more extreme positions only
on some specific, hot issues, such as abortion, sexual morality, and, lately,
the war in Iraq (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Evans 2003; Fiorina,
Abrams, and Pope 2005; Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon 2006). More systematic
polarization appears in mass partisanship: those who are politically active
or identify themselves with a party or ideology tend to have more extreme
positions than the rest of the population. Moreover, the relation between
party identification (or liberal-conservative political ideology) and voting
behavior has reached its highest level in the last 50 years, after the era
of partisan dealignment of the 1960s and 1970s (Bartels 2000; Hether-
ington 2001; Bafumi 2004).
For those scholars according to whom political polarization must imply
a divergence of public opinion on a broad set of issues (DiMaggio et al.
1996) and reflect a consistent set of alternative beliefs (Fiorina et al. 2005),
3 Like any theory of democracy, political pluralism is, first and foremost, a political
philosophy. As such, it might appear ill suited to empirical analysis. Nonetheless,
several aspects of the current regulatory system (e.g., norms of party and interest-
group competition and division of power, as well as many social policies) are based
on the principles and justified according to the logic of political pluralism, making the
goal of assessing the validity of its assumptions crucial to both supporters and skeptics
of this political theory.
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American public opinion is not polarized: there is evidence of attitude
polarization only on a few issues, and people are often ambivalent in their
preferences. Conversely, for those scholars who think that polarization is
in place when broad ideological or partisan dividing lines exist, even
though public opinion polarizes only on certain issues, American public
opinion is polarized (Kohut et al. 2000; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler
2002; Greenberg 2004; Mayer 2004; Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Baf-
umi and Shapiro 2007).
With respect to the increased partisanship of the general public, two
different explanations can be advanced. One hypothesis is that citizens
are changing, becoming more coherent in their political preferences over
time; the other is that, even though their preferences have remained stable,
citizens have responded to the growing party extremism by splitting into
alternative camps.
The substantive contribution of our analysis is to offer support for the
latter hypothesis by showing that Americans have become more coherent
in matching their issue preferences with their party and ideology, but their
level of issue constraint has remained essentially stable—and low. Thus,
increased issue partisanship is not due to higher ideological coherence;
rather, as suggested by Fiorina et al. (2005), it mostly arose from parties’
being more polarized and therefore doing a better job at sorting individ-
uals along ideological lines. Individuals themselves have not moved; sim-
ply, they now perceive parties as being more radical, and they split
accordingly. However, party polarization might have gained momentum
as party voters became more clearly divided in their preferences, thus
establishing a self-reinforcing dynamic.
Outline
The article unfolds as follows: First, we summarize the current debate
on elite and public opinion polarization and outline our hypotheses about
the trends in issue partisanship and issue alignment. Second, we claim
that the coherence of individuals’ beliefs systems is relevant when dis-
cussing polarization, and we support our argument by using a simple
theoretical model to show that variations in the level of correlation of
political preferences induce variations in the overall ideological distance
between individuals.
We next present our method and data. We use the American National
Election Study (NES) cumulative data set (1972–2004) to study trends in
issue partisanship (bivariate correlations of issues with party identification
or ideology) and issue alignment (correlations between pairs of issues).4
4 It is hard to come up with a good terminology. What we call issue partisanship has
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We report results in three sections. The first section focuses on issue
partisanship and suggests that citizens’ opinions on some issues—espe-
cially, but not exclusively, moral issues—have become substantially more
correlated with party identity and political ideology over time. In the
second section, we turn to issue alignment and show that there is no
comparable increase in the correlation between issues. Moreover, we do
not observe increasing correlation between issue domains, and we there-
fore conclude that there is no evidence of issue alignment in the mass
public. In the third section, we look at trends in issue partisanship and
issue alignment within population subgroups. This allows us to conclude
that political activists, southerners, and churchgoers have experienced
patterns of issue partisanship and alignment similar to those observed in
the rest of the population. In contrast, politically sophisticated and wealth-
ier voters have seen faster growth in issue partisanship and alignment.
Finally, patterns of issue alignment differ somewhat between Republican
and Democratic voters. In the discussion, we focus on the consequences
of these opinion changes on the political process, inviting a reconsideration
of the traditional liberal-pluralistic account of American politics.
THE DEBATE OVER POLITICAL POLARIZATION
Political polarization is not new in American politics. According to Brady
and Han’s (2006, p. 120) historical analysis, “For many years, our political
institutions and policy-making processes have withstood sharp divisions
between the parties”; this includes the Civil War era, the turn of the 20th
century, and the New Deal era. What is distinctive about the present
period is the division between elite and mass polarization. There is in
fact ample evidence of polarization in the party-in-government and the
party-as-organization—to use the classical categories of V. O. Key (1958)—
but a veil of ambiguity remains (despite a decade of research) with respect
to the party in the electorate.5
been also referred to as partisan sorting (see Hetherington, in press). Moreover, to
study issue alignment we use Converse’s (1964) measure of constraint. Nonetheless,
we use the term issue alignment instead of constraint, which is most common, because
we focus on alignment between issue domains; we only marginally engage the debate
on the constraint of mass political belief systems.
5 For Brady and Han (2006), this disconnect is due to a lag in the nationalization of
congressional elections. Polarization in presidential elections has increased, starting in
the mid-1960s, while congressional elections have resisted such polarizing trends, and
cross-party voting persisted through the early 1990s.
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Party and Activist Polarization
After a long period of depolarization that began at the end of World War
I, political parties started to move further apart in the early 1970s. As
documented by the extensive analysis of congressional roll-call voting
(Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 2007; Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1996), interest
groups’ ratings (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, chap. 8), and other sources
(Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006), members of Congress have aligned
at opposite ends of the liberal–conservative spectrum, and the number of
moderate representatives has steadily decreased.
The electoral realignment of the southern states (Carmines and Stimson
1989; Rohde 1991; Layman et al. 2006; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008)
and the mobilization, in the middle of the 1960s, of grassroots conservative
groups during the Goldwater campaign (Perlstein 2001; Brady and Han
2006) marked the beginning of a consistent movement of the Republican
Party toward more conservative positions. Exiting moderate Republican
members of Congress were replaced by a new cohort of socially conser-
vative Republicans. This trend became even more prominent in the early
1990s. Simultaneously, moderate Democrats retired or were defeated, and
new Democratic members were more liberal, and so the divisions between
northern and southern Democrats in Congress were diminished (Wilcox
1995; Fleisher and Bond 2000; Jacobson 2005). The political issues at
stake in this period well reflected the declining bipartisanship of the na-
tional elite, from Ronald Reagan’s economic and social program, to the
socially conservative program and confrontational strategy that charac-
terized the Republican Party in the early 1990s, to Bill Clinton’s liberal
policies on matters of gay rights, abortion, taxation, and health insurance
(Trubowitz and Mellow 2005).
Several scholars have identified the increased polarization of party ac-
tivists as the element that has triggered party polarization. Indeed, activ-
ists have become more important in the selection of party nominees in
recent decades, and they tend to have more radical views than the average
citizen. In addition, the growth, starting in the 1970s, of single-issue-based
interest groups has had a radicalizing effect on parties’ primaries and
legislative behavior in Congress (Saunders and Abramowitz 2004; Brady
and Han 2006; Layman et al. 2006). Polarization shows similar trends
among activists as among congressional representatives, although a clear
causal relation has yet to be established. Nonetheless, once activated, party
and activist polarization dynamics might have reinforced each other: the
more party leaders “emphasize ideological appeals, the more likely that
party will be to attract ideologically motivated activists. The involvement
of these ideologically motivated activists may, in turn, reinforce ideological
extremism among party leaders” (Saunders and Abramowitz 2004, p. 287).
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Both mechanisms of persuasion and mechanisms of selective recruitment
were at work in radicalizing leaders (Fleisher and Bond 2000) and activists
(Layman and Carsey 2002), with the final outcome of making the core of
the Democratic Party more liberal and its Republican counterpart more
conservative.
It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that after a period of decline
in the importance of party identification and ideology, partisan loyalties
have started to count more, to the point that, in the middle of the 1990s,
their impact on voting behavior reached its highest level in at least 50
years (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001;
Bafumi 2004). Nonetheless, the fact that self-identified Republicans (or
conservatives) are more likely to vote for the Republican Party today than
they were 30 years ago—and the same is true of Democrats—should not
be interpreted per se as a sign of public opinion polarization. Rather,
“Elite polarization has clarified public perceptions of the parties’ ideo-
logical differences” (Hetherington 2001, p. 619), and therefore “the public
may increasingly come to develop and apply partisan predispositions”
(Bartels 2000, p. 44). To what extent increased mass partisanship has
brought about (or is related to) public opinion polarization—and to what
extent individuals’ partisanship conforms with their issue preferences—
is still an open question.
Public Opinion Polarization
The debate among scholars on the level of polarization of the American
public has grown along with a certain ambiguity on what opinion po-
larization really means and how it should be empirically measured. One
way to look at public opinion polarization is to focus on the distribution
of political attitudes across all Americans. If there is polarization, we
should observe a change in the shape of the opinion distribution, moving
from a unimodal to a flat or bimodal distribution. DiMaggio et al. (1996),
looking at the population as a whole, have documented a general trend
toward consensus on racial, gender, and crime issues, stability on nu-
merous others, and evidence of polarization only on attitudes toward
abortion, the poor, and, more recently, sexual morality (Evans 2003).
But one might want to track changes between subgroups of the pop-
ulation, distinguishing people along sociodemographic lines. For this pur-
pose, DiMaggio et al. (1996) looked at the level of opinion disagreement
between subgroups by comparing different categories of respondents. The
results suggest that evidence of intergroup polarization is scarce. With
respect to age, gender, education, region, and religious affiliation, the
results portray stability or even instances of depolarization. Fiorina et al.
(2005) and Fischer and Hout (2006) reach more or less the same conclu-
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sions. In contrast, Abramowitz and Saunders (2005) suggest that the mass
public is deeply divided between red states and blue states and between
churchgoers and secular voters.
Alternatively, one can look for changes in the distance between partisan
subgroups, distinguishing people along ideological lines. In this case, there
is clear evidence of polarization between self-identified liberals and con-
servatives, as well as among party affiliates and political activists
(DiMaggio et al. 1996; Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Fiorina et al.
2005). Bafumi and Shapiro (2007), analyzing the trend in the mean po-
sition of Democrats and Republicans and liberals and conservatives with
respect to a large set of political issues, have found that partisans and
ideologues are increasingly divided not only on issues such as abortion,
gay rights, and the role of religion, but also on issues of race and civil
rights. Similarly, Layman and Carsey (2002) have found that attitude
constraint between social welfare and moral issues has increased among
party identifiers (i.e., people who identify with a political party). Finally,
looking at party voters, the divide between Democrats and Republicans
has greatly increased on many issues (Jacobson 2005, 2007).
In general, scholars’ analyses differ because of the social or partisan
categories (class, ethnicity, religious affiliation, party identification, etc.)
that are thought to be relevant for mapping social division and the di-
mensions around which public opinion is expected to split (polarization
might be confined to people’s attitudes on specific issues or instead spread
across a broad set of issues). The way in which these two aspects have
been combined has led different scholars to different conclusions.
When the focus is on the population as a whole or on different social
groups (thus slicing the population along socioeconomic lines), scholars
find evidence of polarization only on a few political attitudes. This has
led them to conclude that, in general, American citizens are uncertain and
ambivalent and therefore more likely to take central positions than ex-
treme positions and to combine conservative and liberal attitudes on dif-
ferent issues. The same scholars have also tended to look at polarization
across multiple issue domains, thus emphasizing the overall stability of
public opinion. In contrast, scholars who look primarily at partisan af-
filiations and thus slice the population along party or ideological lines
have concluded that the nation is increasingly divided. They also tend to
give disproportionate attention to currently salient issues such as abortion
or the war in Iraq. These scenarios do not necessarily contradict each
other (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). Indeed, both are realistic—al-
though not complete—descriptions of contemporary America.
In this article we provide a comprehensive account of trends in issue
partisanship (the relation between issues and ideology) and issue align-
ment (the level of constraint within and between diverse issue domains),
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thus disentangling the effect of party ideology from dynamics of alignment
in attitude preferences. Increased issue partisanship can be thought of as
a reflection of parties’ differentiation and elite polarization, whereas
higher levels of issue alignment would suggest that citizens are increas-
ingly splitting along multiple lines of potential conflict. While both dy-
namics might have consequences on political integration—an aspect that
we will discuss in the conclusion of this article—issue alignment is more
likely to amplify the ideological distance between citizens and thus in-
crease public opinion polarization, while issue partisanship might foster
dynamics of unequal representation.
By separately investigating the extent to which the electorate has be-
come more ideological and actual changes in the way in which people (or
some population subgroups) combine their issue preferences, we can prop-
erly address the two most popular explanations of the changes in American
public opinion. One explanation argues that elite polarization has made
it easier for ordinary citizens to see the differences between parties and
that therefore citizens are now better at sorting themselves between Re-
publicans and Democrats or liberals and conservatives (Hetherington
2001; Fiorina et al. 2005; Levendusky 2004). The other argues that citizens
(or subgroups of them) have themselves changed and that moral issues
have lined up with economic and civil rights issues to substantially rad-
icalize people’s preferences and boost their partisanship (Layman and
Carsey 2002; Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Bafumi and Shapiro 2007).
Two hypotheses follow:
Hypothesis 1.—If it is parties that are moving, while people’s opinions
have not changed, we expect to observe increasing issue partisanship (evi-
dence that parties are better at sorting out their voters) but no increase
in constraint in people’s political attitudes—and thus no issue alignment.
Hypothesis 2a.—If a real movement has occurred within the popu-
lation, we expect instances of issue alignment in public opinion and thus
higher levels of constraint among issues and between issue domains.
In general, growing levels of alignment of interests might challenge the
political pluralist model of crosscutting interests, but this might occur
solely among the political elite (hypothesis 1) or among the larger public
as well (hypothesis 2a). A second potential deviation from the political
pluralism model is introduced by dynamics of group or partisan sorting,
leading to the systematic underrepresentation of certain social categories.
We study this second aspect by analyzing time trends within population
subgroups and consider some possible variants of hypothesis 2a.
In the literature on public opinion, the theme of issue consistency and
constraint has been investigated for a long time, usually with the conclu-
sion that only a minority of very interested and informed people show
real opinion constraint, while the large majority of the public is “innocent
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of ideology” (Converse 1964, p. 241). In the last two decades, the debate
has been reframed in terms of population heterogeneity, and scholars have
focused on the different heuristics people deploy in their political reasoning
(Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin
2000; Baldassarri and Schadee 2006). In both cases, results suggest that
there are substantial differences across citizens with respect to their level
of political sophistication and that only a small group of them fully deploy
ideological categories. Since politically sophisticated and active citizens
are more likely to be politically influential (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) but
also have more extreme political views (Baldassarri 2008), it is relevant
to investigate whether trends in issue partisanship and alignment among
the subset of politically committed citizens differ from trends in the entire
population. In fact, an influential minority can affect, in the long term,
the political preferences of the rest of the electorate (Layman and Carsey
2002). We therefore consider the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2b.—A real movement has occurred within the subset of
the population that is politically more sophisticated or active.
Within a broad set of social categories (gender, age, ethnicity, class,
geographic location, etc.) some social groups are, or have the potential to
become, politically influential (through lobbying and interest groups) and
thus have an impact on the policy-making process—for instance, by set-
ting the agenda. If instances of polarization occur within such groups,
this might reverberate with the political elite, if not with the mass public.
Present-day lines of potential social division seem to be based on economic
status—often measured through education or income (Frank 2004; An-
solabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2006b; Bartels 2006; Fischer and Hout
2006; McCarty et al. 2006; )—and cultural values, captured here by region
and religion (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; McVeigh and Soboleski
2007). We therefore study the differences between trends in partisanship
and issue alignment for different population subgroups.
Hypothesis 2c.—A real movement has occurred within some popu-
lation subgroups (such as more educated and wealthier people, southern-
ers, or churchgoers).
Many studies have documented the increased ideological consistency
of party voters (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998) as well as the grow-
ing division between Republicans and Democrats on a broad range of
political issues (Bafumi and Shapiro 2007; Jacobson 2007). The sorting
of Republicans and Democrats along ideological lines might have trans-
lated into greater issue alignment among partisans (Layman and Carsey
2002). Given that the political elite has a vital interest in maintaining its
constituency, the consolidation of voters’ preferences might have an im-
pact on parties’ conduct, even if similar patterns are not visible in the
population at large. This leads us to our final variation on hypothesis 2a:
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Hypothesis 2d.—Issue alignment has occurred among party
identifiers.
Correlation as Polarization
The pundits like to slice-and-dice our country into red states and blue states:
red states for Republicans, blue states for Democrats. But I’ve got news
for them, too. We worship an awesome God in the blue states, and we don’t
like federal agents poking around in our libraries in the red states. We coach
Little League in the blue states and, yes, we’ve got some gay friends in the
red states. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq, and patriots
who supported the war in Iraq. (Barack Obama, Democratic National Con-
vention, July 27, 2004)
The fans and the detractors of Senator Barack Obama’s celebrated key-
note address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention interpreted his
lines as a plea for bipartisan politics and national unity. Nonetheless, few
observers took it at face value, as an actual picture of the state of the
country. This is unfortunate because, in this regard, he got it right.
For instance, in 2004, 40% of the respondents to the NES were self-
declared Republicans (including leaners), but only 23% were both self-
declared Republicans and conservative (32% if we consider only the sub-
sample of people who answered both questions). Almost half of the
Republicans did not perceive themselves as being ideologically conser-
vative. If we also consider issue preferences, the constraint of people’s
political preferences looks even weaker. Only 12% of the respondents are
Republican and conservative and oppose abortion (in part or completely),
while 16% are Republican and conservative and do not favor affirmative
action, and 13% are Republican and conservative and think that gov-
ernment should not support health insurance programs. Altogether, in our
2004 sample, only 6% of respondents are Republicans who think of them-
selves as conservatives, oppose abortion, and have conservative views on
affirmative action and health policy. Fully 85% of self-declared Repub-
licans are nonconservative or take a nonconservative stand on at least
one of these three traditional issues. A similar picture emerges if we look
at Democrats. In this case, of the 49% of the sample who are self-declared
Democrats, only 36% call themselves liberals. Overall, almost 90% of
Democrats are nonliberal or have nonliberal views on abortion, affir-
mative action, or health policy.
As we have noted above, empirical attempts at assessing the polari-
zation of mass opinion have mostly focused on the distribution of single
issues, while rarely looking at the correlation of people’s opinions on
different political issues. From a substantive point of view, it makes sense
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that if people align along multiple, potentially divisive issues, even if they
do not take extreme positions on single issues, the end result is a polarized
society. For instance, consider a population with opinions on two dimen-
sions: color (50% of the people prefer green, 50% prefer yellow) and shape
(50% prefer circle, 50% prefer triangle). If opinions are independent (thus,
dimensions are orthogonal), 25% of people will prefer green circle, 25%
green triangle, 25% yellow circle, and 25% yellow triangle. At the other
extreme, if the two dimensions are perfectly correlated, 50% of the people
will have one preference (e.g., green circle) and 50% will be in the opposite
corner (yellow triangle), but the opinion distribution on the single issues
will not change.
For another example, consider a population with opinions on four di-
mensions, following a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1 on each opinion and correlation r between any pair of issues.
In one limiting case, the correlation between dimensions is null and the
four opinions are independent; in the other limiting case, the four di-
mensions have correlation 1, which means that individuals hold exactly
the same opinion on all four issues. In between, there are situations in
which the four dimensions are correlated, with correlations of different
magnitude. As the correlation between issues increases, the opinion dis-
tribution on each issue remains the same, but the ideological distance in
the population increases.
To show this, we measure ideological distance in two ways. First, we
compute a synthetic opinion score as the average position on the four
dimensions. Figure 1, part A, plots the distribution of the average positions
for five different correlations: 0, .25, .5, .75, and 1. As the correlation
increases, the variance of the average score distribution grows as well.
When dimensions are positively correlated, there are more people with
overall extreme views than in a context in which dimensions are not
correlated, even though the opinion distribution on each single issue re-
mains the same.
Second, we can measure polarization by returning to the concept pre-
sented at the beginning of the article of society’s dividing into two ho-
mogeneous parts that are far apart from each other, and by therefore
focusing on the distribution of distances between pairs of people. The
more a population is polarized, the higher the variation of the distance
between pairs of individuals, because they are either very close or very
distant. According to our argument, we would expect that as the corre-
lation between ideological dimensions increases, the distance between in-
dividuals that belong to the same cluster decreases, while the distance
between people that belong to alternative clusters increases. Mathemat-
ically, we can divide a multivariate distribution into two pieces by finding
the optimal separation that will minimize the average distances between
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Fig. 1.—Ideological distance for different levels of correlation (r) between dimensions,
from a simple four-dimensional normal model.
people within each piece.6 Here, the population is partitioned into clusters
according to the sign of the opinion score previously computed. Figure
1, part B, presents results using Manhattan distance (similar results were
obtained using Euclidean distance). In our four-dimensional normal ex-
ample, where the separate distributions on each issue remain unchanged,
we find that, as correlations between issues increase, the average distance
6 In statistics, this is called k-means clustering, in this case with ; in the specialkp 2
case of the multivariate normal distribution, the clusters are determined by a plane
slicing diagonally through the space.
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between pairs of people remains stable, the average distance between
pairs of people within clusters decreases, and the average distance between
pairs of people in different clusters increases.
For all these theoretical reasons, we see correlation as an important
aspect of polarization that has not been captured in previous analyses of
a single question at a time (or in previous analyses such as Ansolabehere,
Rodden, and Snyder [2006a], which combine questions in valuable ways
to get more useful and precise summaries of issue positions, but do not
consider the correlations as informative in themselves). We next turn to
the analysis of the correlation between political attitudes in America.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
High-quality national surveys since the 1970s have included a consistent
number of attitude questions on political issues, ranging from state in-
tervention and spending to civil rights, morality, and foreign policy. Un-
fortunately, few of these questions were asked consistently over time, and
so any attempt at tracing the temporal evolution of public opinion on
political attitudes is a difficult enterprise. For instance, in what is probably
the most comprehensive study of trends in public opinion polarization,
DiMaggio et al. (1996) could rely only on seven attitude questions from
the NES cumulative data set (of which four were feeling thermometers)
and nine attitude questions from the GSS cumulative data set (see also
Layman and Carsey 2002; Fischer and Hout 2006).
We overcome the problem that questions were not asked consistently
over time and make virtually complete use of the information on re-
spondents’ political attitudes collected through sample surveys. In short,
we work with the correlations rather than modeling the data directly.7
We focus on the evolution of the correlation between opinions rather than
on the evolution of opinion distributions on single issues. In this way,
even though each pair of questions has not been asked for the entire time
period, their correlation remains informative to an assessment of the trend
in opinion correlations. Specifically, to study the evolution of issue par-
tisanship, we look at the correlation between single issues and party iden-
tification or political ideology, while to study trends in issue alignment
we focus on the correlation between pairs of issues. Our unit of analysis
is issue correlation#year (for issue partisanship) or issue-pair correla-
tion#year (for issue alignment), and the basic idea is that every attitude
question that has been asked at least twice can be potentially informative
7 We present results using Pearson correlations. Similar results are obtained using other
correlation measures.
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to an assessment of the overall trends in issue partisanship and issue
alignment.
Our primary interest lies in time trends of correlation. In any given
year, the available data sample is large but not huge, and thus correlation
estimates and their trends can be unstable, especially for questions that
were asked only for a few years. The simple way to handle this problem
is to estimate a common time trend for all the correlations in the study.
However, this would not allow us to differentiate between issues and to
tell if some are becoming more correlated while others remain stable or
show patterns of decreasing correlation. Multilevel models—in this case,
varying-intercept, varying-slope models—allow us to estimate variation
and trends in the presence of uncertainty in the correlation estimates
(Snijders and Bosker 1999; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Gelman and Hill
2007).8
Here, we present results from the NES, cumulative data file 1948–
2004.9 Questions coded in a comparable fashion across years are merged
in this data set. Considering all the attitude questions that were asked at
least three times, we analyzed a total of 47 issues. Since most of them
were asked beginning in 1972, we present results for the time period 1972–
2004.10 To facilitate the interpretation of the results, all questions were
coded in order to range opinions on a scale from liberal to conservative,
and thus correlations are generally positive.
We classified attitude questions according to four different issue do-
mains: economic, civil rights, moral, and security and foreign policy.11
Examples of economic issues are government’s involvement in the pro-
vision of health insurance and a jobs guarantee, or federal spending for
the poor, welfare, or food stamps. Civil rights issues concern the treatment
8 We fit the models using the lmer function in R, which estimates multilevel models
using a point estimate for the group-level variance parameters; this works well as long
as the group-level variances are separate from 0 and group-level correlations are
separate from (see, e.g., Gelman and Hill 2007).1
9 The NES data are available from the Center for Political Studies at the University
of Michigan.
10 All the analyses were also performed on the 1948–2004 time period, and no sub-
stantive differences were found.
11 To assess the robustness of the classification, we relied on the principles of intercoder
reliability. Four different people were asked to independently classify the attitude
questions. Differences were minor, occuring for only three questions. Moreover, the
classification of these questions does not substantially change the results reported here.
It may seem strange, e.g., that the question on urban unrest is included within security
and foreign policy. Another option would be to characterize urban unrest as a civil
rights issue. But doing so does not change our results, except for increasing the un-




of African-Americans and other minorities, as well as affirmative action
and equality of opportunities and chances, while moral issues range from
abortion to gay rights, women’s role in society, traditional values, and
new lifestyles. Finally, security and foreign policy issues (hereafter referred
to as simply foreign policy issues) include, among others, international
cooperation, federal spending for defense and crime prevention, and how
to handle urban unrest.
In addition to these questions, we measured party identification using
the standard seven-point self-identification scale, ranging from strong
Democrat (1) to strong Republican (7), and measured political ideology
with a seven-point scale that ranges from extremely liberal (1) to extremely
conservative (7). We also considered classic sociodemographic variables
to study the trend in partisanship and alignment within population
subgroups.
RESULTS
Analysis 1: Issue Partisanship
To what extent does party identification or liberal-conservative political
ideology predict individuals’ opinions on specific issues? As previously
anticipated, the constraint between partisanship and issue attitudes is
generally weak. Average correlations between party identification or ide-
ology and issue opinions range between 0 and .3. Figure 2 reports the
average correlation between each of the 47 issues and both party iden-
tification (black dots) and political ideology (gray dots). Issues are divided
among the four domains, and within each domain, they are sorted ac-
cording to the intensity of the correlation with party identification.
Economic issues have the highest average correlation with party iden-
tification, followed by civil rights issues. In contrast, foreign policy issues
are loosely related to party affiliation, which confirms their bipartisan
nature. Results are similar if we look at the correlation between issues
and self-placement on the liberal-conservative continuum, with one in-
teresting exception: moral issues are substantially more linked to ideology
than to party identification. The magnitude of the correlation between
moral issues and political ideology is similar to that observed for economic
issues.
Let us now consider the variation over time. To test the hypothesis of
increasing issue partisanship, we fit a multilevel model with varying in-
tercepts and slopes in which the unit of analysis is issue pair#year and
Fig. 2.—Average correlations of issue attitudes with party identification (black dots) and
liberal-conservative political ideology (gray dots), by issue domain. For each domain, issues
are listed in decreasing order of correlation with party identification. Questions have been





Correlation Results from Multilevel Models for Issue
Partisanship
r Issue # Party ID{
(A)
r Issue # Ideology{
(B)
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . .17 (.01) .22 (.01)
Time (decades) . . . . .05 (.01) .04 (.01)
Residual SD:
Intercepts . . . . . . . .08 .08
Trends . . . . . . . . . . .03 .03
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 .04
Notes.—Results for the correlation between issues and (A) party identification
and (B) liberal-conservative political ideology. Varying-intercept and varying-
slope models; 47 pairs, 383 observations.The time variable is zeroed at 1980, and
thus the intercept corresponds to the estimate for that year. Numbers in paren-
theses are SEs.
the second-level units are issues. This model allows the average correlation
(intercept) and time trend (slope) to vary by issue. Formally,
r p a  b t e , (1)it i i it
where is the correlation between issue i and the measure of partisanshiprit
in the year t (i ranges from 1 to 47, while t is time in decades).12 Table 1
displays the results for this model, fit separately to correlations of issue
attitudes with party identification (col. A) and with political ideology (col.
B).
Consider in detail the model for party identification. The average cor-
relation between issues and party identification is .17, with an estimated
standard deviation among issues of .08, which means that about two-
thirds of the correlations are in the interval between .09 and .25. This
confirms that the level of constraint of opinions and partisanship is low:
party identification predicts, on average, only the 17% of people’s opinions
on political issues. Central to our analysis is the coefficient estimate for
the time parameter t: on average, correlations have increased by .05 per
decade (SE p .01). With a standard deviation of .03, most of the trends
are positive, with an estimated 95% between .01 and .11. This suggests
that, for almost all issues, trends are either positive or close to zero. To
portray this result graphically, figure 3 plots the trend of the correlations
for all the issues along with the regression line from the multilevel model.
Issues are sorted according to the intensity of the change over time, start-
ing from those that show the steepest increase, such as (perhaps surpris-
12 The variable t is expressed in decades and centered in 1988 so that the intercepts
and slopes can be more directly interpreted. Formally, .tp (year 1988)/10
Fig. 3.—Trends in the correlation between issues and party identification. Regression
lines as estimated in equation (1); at the bottom of each plot is reported the coefficient .ti
The x-axis is time (1972–2004), and the y-axis is correlation (.1 to .4).
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ingly) federal spending for the environment and (less surprisingly) new
lifestyles, traditional values, abortion, affirmative action, and moral be-
havior, to those that are stable overall, such as federal spending on welfare,
the poor, food stamps, and social security.
Modeling the correlation between issues and political ideology, we ob-
tain similar results (see table 1, col. A). In this case, the mean correlation
is .22, and the correlations increase, on average, by .04 every 10 years.
Again, most of the change is in the direction of a strengthened relation
between issues and ideology, as the plots in figure 4 demonstrate. Here,
we report the trend over time of the correlation between each issue and
self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale. With only few exceptions,
the slopes are positive or close to zero.
In sum, our results suggest that issue partisanship has increased over
time. Nonetheless, as a careful inspection of figures 3 and 4 indicates, it
is possible that the rise in the correlations has occurred mostly (or only)
in some issue domains and less (or not) in others. To test this hypothesis,
we specify a model that distinguishes issue types according to the four
issue domains. Results are reported in table 2. With respect to both party
identification and political ideology, we notice that economic issues have
the highest average correlation (.24 in both cases), followed by civil rights
issues (.18 and .22, respectively), moral issues (.11 and .20), and foreign
policy issues (.10 and .16). More interesting, the temporal variations of
the correlation coefficients vary among issue domains. For economic issues
the increase is, on average, .04 per decade with party identification and
.03 with political ideology, but the correlations of moral issues with party
and ideology have grown by .08 and .07 per decade, respectively.
Figure 5 summarizes these trends and allows a direct comparison of
the four issue domains. Both measures of partisanship show similar pat-
terns: since the beginning of the time period considered here, economic
issues have been the most partisanly aligned, followed by civil rights and
then foreign policy and moral issues. While the increment has proceeded
more or less at the same pace in the first three issue domains, thus keeping
stable the distance between these domains, the partisanship of moral issues
has grown faster, to the point that moral issues have substantially reduced
the gap with other issue domains in regard to their correlation with party
identification (starting from a situation, in the 1970s, in which there was
virtually no relation). Even more striking, with respect to political ide-
ology, the domain of moral issues has recently become the most partisan
among the four.
We conclude that issue partisanship has increased in all issue domains,
although at different speeds, and that citizens now divide along ideological
lines not only on economic and civil rights issues but also on matters of
morality. This tendency in issue partisanship was somewhat expected.
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Fig. 4.—Trends in the correlation between issues and political ideology. Regression lines
as estimated in equation (1); at the bottom of each plot is reported the coefficient . The x-ti
axis is time (1972–2004), and the y-axis is correlation (.1 to .5).
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TABLE 2
Correlation Results from Multilevel Models for Issue Partisanship
by Issue Domains
r Issue # Party ID{
(A)
r Issue # Ideology{
(B)
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 (.02) .24 (.02)
Economic issues . . . . . . . . . . . . baseline baseline
Civil rights issues . . . . . . . . . . .06 (.02) .02 (.03)
Moral issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 (.03) .01 (.03)
Foreign policy issues . . . . . . . .14 (.03) .08 (.04)
Time (decades) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 (.01) .03 (.01)
Time # economic . . . . . . . . . . baseline baseline
Time # civil rights . . . . . . . . .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
Time # moral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 (.02) .04 (.02)
Time # foreign policy . . . . . .00 (.02) .00 (.02)
Residual SD:
Intercepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 .08
Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03 .03
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 .04
Notes.—Results for the correlation between issues and (A) party identification and (B)
liberal-conservative ideology. Varying-intercept and varying-slope models; 47 pairs, 383 obser-
vations. The time variable is zeroed at 1980, and thus the intercept corresponds to the estimate
for that year. Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
Fig. 5.—Trends in issue partisanship for different issue domains
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Our goal is now to assess if the increased coherence between issue pref-
erences and party affiliation or ideology is simply the by-product of the
strengthened partisanship and polarization of parties or, instead, if it is
the case that increasing issue partisanship goes along with increasing issue
alignment. In other words, we will investigate whether people now are
not only better at combining their opinions with their partisanship but
also show greater coherence in combining their preferences on multiple
issues.
Analysis 2: Issue Alignment
One can have a first, suggestive idea of the trend in issue alignment by
looking at the correlation between pairs of issues over time. Unfortunately,
since 47 issues generate 1,081 potential pairs, we cannot show the trend
for all pairs. Logically, one would expect the greatest increase in cor-
relations among pairs of issues that have had the steepest increase in
partisanship. Accordingly, we select the seven issues with the highest
correlation with party identification and ideology (figs. 3 and 4 reveal that
the top issues are almost the same in both instances). These issues include
new lifestyles, traditional values, abortion, affirmative action, federal
spending for the environment, moral behavior, and equality. Figure 6
plots the correlation between these pairs of issues over time. Despite their
increase in partisanship over the past few decades, the correlation between
these issues seems to have remained stable or, in a few cases, increased
only modestly. This offers scarce support to the hypothesis of issue align-
ment (hypothesis 2a).13 Compare this result to figures 3 and 4, which show
much more dramatic increases in issue partisanship.
To test this hypothesis more formally, we deploy a model that is similar
to the one described previously. Namely, we run a multilevel model with
varying intercept and varying slope in which the unit of analysis is issue-
pair correlations#year. Formally,
r p a  b t e , (2)pt p p pt
where is the correlation between the pair of issues p in the year t.rpt
Results are shown in part A of table 3.
The average correlation between issues is .15, with a standard deviation
of .11, which means that about two-thirds of the pairs’ correlations range
between .04 and .26. With respect to the trend in issue alignment, we
13 Alternatively, one can aggregate survey items on the same issue domain. Following
this strategy, we confirm the findings of Ansolabehere et al. (2006a): when we look at




Fig. 6.—Trends in correlations between pairs of hot issues. The x-axis is time (1984–
2004), and the y-axis is correlation (0 to .6). The plots are redundant: each pair of issues is
plotted twice so that the reader can see on the same row (or column) the correlation between
one issue and all the others.
observe that, on average, the coefficients have increased by .02 per decade.
Although statistically significant (SE p .00), this trend is substantially
lower than the one observed for issue partisanship. Moreover, the estimate
coefficient is close to zero or even negative for most of the pairs: 95% of
issue pairs show trends between .02 and .06. Figure 7 plots the trend
bt estimate for each pair of issues. We highlight the intensity of the change
using different shades of gray. Correlation between issues has substantially
increased in only a few cases; moreover, there are no discernible patterns
within or between issue domains.
According to our hypothesis 2a, issue alignment is expected to induce
TABLE 3
Correlation Results from Fitted Multilevel Models for
Issue Alignment
Model r Pairs of Issues{
A. No grouping of pairs:
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 (.00)
Time (decades) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 (.00)
Residual SD:
Intercepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04
B. Within and between issue domains:
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 (.00)
Within domain pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 (.01)
Time (decades) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 (.00)
Time # within domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.00)
Residual SD:
Intercepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09
Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04
C. Types of issue domains:
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 (.01)
Economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . baseline
Civil rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.01)
Moral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 (.02)
Foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 (.03)
Mixed pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 (.01)
Time (decades) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 (.00)
Time # economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . baseline
Time # civil rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.01)
Time # moral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.01)
Time # foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.02)
Time # mixed pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.00)
Residual SD:
Intercepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09
Trends) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04
Notes.—Results for the correlation between pairs of issues in (A) a model with
no grouping of pairs, (B) a model with pairs grouped by location within or between
domains, and (C) a model with pairs grouped by issue domain. Varying-intercept




Fig. 7.—Time trends in correlations for all pairs of issues. The plot shows the trend
estimates for each pair of issues from the multilevel model for issue alignment as estimated
in equation (2) (a summary of the model is presented in table 3, model A). X’s indicate pairs
for which no observation was available (to compute the estimate, it was necessary for both
issues in a pair to have been asked about in at least two different years).
increased correlation between issue domains, as a consequence of the
increased coherence in people’s belief systems. We test this hypothesis
first by distinguishing between pairs that belong to the same domain and
those that belong to two different domains. In model B of table 3, we
report the results of this test. At any time, we expect higher correlation
between issues that belong to the same domain, and in fact the average
correlation is .23 for within-domain pairs and .12 for between-domain
pairs. In the case of issue alignment, we would expect to observe coef-
ficients for between-domain pairs growing more substantially than the
coefficients of pair correlations within domains. However, this is not what
we find: the modest growth of .02 per decade affects within- and between-
domain pairs alike.
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It might be the case, nonetheless, that issue alignment is occurring only
between some domains. In particular, since we have observed a substantial
increase of partisanship with respect to moral issues, we might expect
opinions on moral issues to have become more constrained. Model C of
table 3 induces us to reject this hypothesis. In this model, we distinguish
pairs according to their issue domain. The correlation within issue do-
mains is, on average, .25 for economic and civil rights issues, lower for
moral issues (.18), and generally null for foreign policy issues. The average
correlation for between-domain (mixed) pairs is .11. Once again, we find
that the intensity of change over time is the same within and between
issue domains.
In sum, evidence in favor of our hypothesis on issue alignment is limited
to a modest trend of increasing correlation between pairs of issues. More-
over, this trend is undifferentiated (since it manifests within each issue
domain and between domains in similar ways) and not generalized (since
several issues show no tendency toward alignment and some are even
moving toward dealignment). This is too little evidence, we conclude, to
talk about actual issue alignment.
Nonetheless, it is possible that different patterns in issue partisanship
and alignment are occurring within subsets of the population or subgroups
of people. This is the subject of our last set of analyses.
Analysis 3: Partisanship and Alignment in Subgroups
Patterns observed in the population as a whole might hide trends in
population subgroups or even cancel out contrasting trends. Hypothesis
2b considers the subset of the population that is politically more sophis-
ticated or active. Some citizens are more interested in politics than others
and thus, on average, have a more structured political belief system. Their
opinions show higher constraint and are more consistent over time. The
question for us is whether patterns in partisanship and issue alignment
are different among the politically sophisticated. The following analysis
shows that, indeed, they are.
Part A of figure 8 shows the trends in partisanship and issue alignment,
distinguishing highly interested people (black line) from people who follow
politics only sporadically (gray line). Each row reports the results from
a multilevel regression model with varying intercept, varying slope,
and correlations grouped by issue domain. The first and second row re-
port models of issue partisanship, issue#party identification and
issue#political ideology, respectively; the third row reports estimates for
the model of issue alignment (issue-pair correlations). As expected, those
who are interested in politics show higher levels of issue constraint. More-
over, issue partisanship on civil rights and moral issues has increased at
Fig. 8.—Trends in issue partisanship and alignment for different levels of interest and
political activism. Estimates from the multilevel regression models with varying intercept,
varying slope, and correlations grouped by issue domain. Each box compares the correlation
trends in an issue domain for two mutually exclusive subgroups. The x-axis is time (1972–
2004), and the y-axis is correlation (.05 to .4).
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a faster pace among those who are interested in politics. And a similar,
although less pronounced, trend is visible for issue alignment.
Part B of figure 8 compares the trend for political activists to the rest
of the population. As was true of the subset of interested citizens, polit-
ically active people have higher issue constraint. But their change over
time is parallel to that of other citizens, a result suggesting that dynamics
of issue partisanship and alignment are more related to cognitive capa-
bilities than to partisan political involvement (although the two often go
together).
We use the same analytical strategy to test hypothesis 2c, consider-
ing first population subgroups defined by education and income (see
fig. 9). While people who attended college differ from those who did not
only in terms of their overall level of constraint (fig. 9, part A), profound
differences exist between the wealthiest—the top 33% of the income dis-
tribution—and the poorest people—the bottom 33% of the income dis-
tribution (fig. 9, part B). Over time, the wealthiest part of the population
has become more ideological and internally more consistent on civil rights
and moral issues. In contrast, the poorest third shows minimal (or even
decreasing) partisanship and issue alignment on civil rights issues and a
moderate growth in partisanship and alignment on moral issues. While
the richest part of the nation has sorted along partisan lines, the poorest
part has not (or not to the same extent). In line with recent studies on
the relation between inequality and politics (McCarty et al. 2006), this
result seems to suggest that economically marginal individuals are grow-
ing increasingly more detached from the political discourse.
Figure 10 considers two factors that have been often associated with
the current wave of polarization: region and religious attendance. Perhaps
surprising to some, the process of partisan realignment along moral issues
has taken place in the same way among southerners and nonsoutherners
and among churchgoers and nonchurchgoers. The only remarkable dif-
ference is the strong party realignment of southerners on economic issues.
This does not mean that people in these different subgroups think alike—
indeed, they do not (Ansolabehere et al. 2006b)—but it means that patterns
of increasing polarization on moral issues are not disproportionally driven
by some population subgroups. They involve the entire population.
Last, we consider the possibility that issue alignment has occurred
among party voters (hypothesis 2d). Looking separately at trends among
Republican and Democratic voters (see fig. 11), we find clear evidence of
increasing constraint within issue domains, especially among Republicans.
In fact, Republicans have become more consistent on economic and civil
rights issues, while Democrats have lost constraint on these issues and
become a bit more coherent in their moral views. In both groups of voters,
the constraint is growing faster than in the populace as a whole. Overall,
Fig. 9.—Trends in issue partisanship and alignment for different levels of education and
income. Estimates from the multilevel regression models with varying intercept, varying
slope, and correlations grouped by issue domain. Each box compares the correlation trends
in an issue domain for two mutually exclusive subgroups. The x-axis is time (1972–2004),
and the y-axis is correlation (.05 to .4). In the education models, high education means
college or higher, low education means no college.
Fig. 10.—Trends in issue partisanship and alignment by region and religious attendance.
Estimates from the multilevel regression models with varying intercept, varying slope, and
correlations grouped by issue domain. Each box compares the correlation trends in an issue
domain for two mutually exclusive subgroups. The x-axis is time (1972–2004), and the y-
axis is correlation (.05 to .4).In the religious attendance models, high attendance means
twice a month or more, and low attendance means less than twice a month.
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Fig. 11.—Trends in issue alignment, separately considering Democratic and Republican
voters. Estimates from the multilevel regression models with varying intercept, varying
slope, and correlations grouped by issue domain. The x-axis is time (1972–2004), and the
y-axis is correlation (.05 to .4).
alignment has occurred among party voters, but asymmetrically. Repub-
licans are aligning on social themes, whereas Democrats are catching up
on moral issues. In neither group is there evidence of alignment along
issue domains.14 This reinforces our argument about the role of parties
in sorting voters along partisan lines, but it simultaneously suggests that
the increasing coherence of party voters—who are usually the primary
concern for many elected officials—might have (or have had) an impact
on the views and strategies of the political elite.
DISCUSSION
Why are Americans so worried about political polarization? And should
they be worried? Scholars and pundits seem to be concerned with polar-
ization because of its consequences for interest representation, political
integration, and social stability. Political polarization constitutes a threat
to the extent that it induces alignment along multiple lines of potential
conflict and organizes individuals and groups around exclusive identities,
thus crystallizing the public arena into opposite factions. In contrast,
intrasocial conflict is sustainable as long as there are multiple and non-
overlapping lines of disagreement. Starting from these premises, we have
argued that polarization has to be conceived not only as a phenomenon
of opinion radicalization, but also as a process of ideological division and
preference alignment.
Thinking of polarization as a process of alignment along multiple di-
mensions of potential conflict led us not simply to study an aspect of
polarization yet to be considered, but also to address broader concerns
related to its potential consequences for the political process and to ask
to what extent contemporary America is moving away from the ideal of
14 Results not shown are available from the authors.
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political pluralism. By distinguishing between trends in issue partisanship
and issue alignment, we were able to disentangle dynamics of interest
alignment that might sharpen divisions in the political arena and of group
or partisan sorting that might give disproportionate voice to certain pop-
ulation subgroups and lead to the systematic underrepresentation of oth-
ers, thus making the democratic process more unequal. In the next par-
agraphs, we summarize our main findings and discuss their potential
consequences for political representation.
In general, we have found that people’s preferences are loosely con-
nected, and even the correlation between their preferences and partisan-
ship is low. But this alone cannot be regarded as a decisive proof of the
crosscutting nature of people’s political interests, since such a low level
of constraint is only partially interpretable as an indicator of the com-
posite, multifaceted nature of people’s political views. The scarce coher-
ence in people’s attitudes is to some extent due to their low level of political
sophistication: in fact, much of the population is not interested in politics,
does not follow political debate, and is minimally capable of organizing
its preferences according to classical ideological categories (Converse 1964;
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). That said, it is nonetheless informative
to look at temporal and group variations in levels of issue constraint.
We first considered the trend of issue partisanship over time and con-
cluded that the relation between people’s political attitudes and their party
identification or political ideology has tightened. A substantial growth in
the correlation between issues and partisanship is observable for all issue
domains, but the change is significantly more intense in the case of moral
issues. At the beginning of the 1970s, the partisan divide was visible only
for economic and, to a lesser extent, civil rights issues. Thirty years later,
Democrats and Republicans (and liberals and conservatives) divided in
their opinions on moral issues as well. The economic domain remains the
most tightly related to party identification, followed by civil rights and
moral issues, while, with respect to political ideology, moral issues are
now the most distinct dividing line.
In general, our analysis adds to other scholars’ findings on the increasing
importance of partisanship: we show that partisanship not only has an
impact on voting behavior (Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001), but plays
a more important role in partitioning voters according to their issue pref-
erences. We confirm that moral issues have become a stable component
of partisan identities, but we argue that it is by no means the only (or
the most important) one. Manza and Brooks (1999) have convincingly
supported the persistent importance of traditional social cleavages of class,
race, and religiosity in determining voting behavior. Accordingly, our
study shows that individuals have become more partisan not only on
moral issues, but also on economics and civil rights.
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Second, we turned to the study of issue alignment, modeling the cor-
relation between pairs of issues, and found only feeble evidence of issue
alignment. We observe a minimal increase in the correlations; moreover,
the trend does not differentiate pairs of issues within and across issue
domains, and it does not involve a large group of issues or a meaningful
subset of them.
Taken together, these two results support our hypothesis 1, suggesting
that changes in the electorate should be interpreted as an illusory ad-
justment of citizens to the renovated partisanship of the political elite. In
other words, since the parties are now more clearly divided—and on a
broader set of issues—it is easier for people to split accordingly, without
changing their own views (this is why we use the term illusory). There
has been some discussion regarding the directionality of the change, with
most scholars suggesting that public opinion polarization is a consequence
of elite polarization (Layman et al. 2006). Our results confirm this inter-
pretation, since, despite partisan alignment, we found no real instances
of issue alignment. If it were the case that changes in voters’ preferences
had affected the party elite, we would instead have found evidence of
issue alignment in the electorate, since issue alignment has certainly oc-
curred among the political elite (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Nonetheless,
as we will discuss later, the sorting of voters along party lines is likely to
have had an impact on parties’ strategies.
So far, we have reviewed changes in the entire population. Further
examining trends in issue partisanship and alignment within population
subgroups allowed us to reveal potential mechanisms of unequal repre-
sentation. Population subgroups differ in their overall levels of constraint:
people who are wealthier, more educated, and interested in politics show,
at any moment in time, higher correlations in issue attitudes than other
members of the population. More interestingly, in some cases, trends in
issue partisanship and alignment also differ. Specifically, we noticed that
those who are more interested in politics have grown more coherent in
their beliefs on moral and civil rights issues at a faster pace than the
remainder of the population, thus broadening the gap between these
groups’ respective levels of constraint on these issues. A similar and more
striking pattern was observed among the richest third of the population,
who have become more coherent in their political preferences, and in the
relation between these preferences and partisanship, while the poorest
have remained essentially inconsistent. We do not observe any pattern,
however, when dividing the population by region or by church attendance.
Our work reinforces the findings of McCarty et al. (2006) on the relation
between elite polarization and inequality by suggesting that substantial
partisan and issue alignment has occurred within the resourceful and
powerful group of rich Americans. The wealthier part of the political
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constituency knows well what it wants, and it is likely, now more than
in the past, to affect the political process. This potentially increases in-
equality in interest representation, not only through lobbying activity and
campaign financing, but also in the ballot (Bartels 2008).15
Finally, issue alignment has occurred among party voters, with Re-
publicans becoming more coherent in their economic and civil rights pref-
erences and Democrats lining up on moral issues. Party voters are more
divided and therefore constitute an easily identifiable target for a party
elite concerned with preserving its constituency. Since parties pay some
attention to voters in defining their strategies and political agenda (Stim-
son 2004; McCarty et al. 2006), nonvoters, by not showing up at the polls,
are undermining their representation capacity both because they do not
get to choose their representatives and because parties’ strategies are less
likely to consider their preferences.
Moreover, it is possible that extreme positions have gained prominence
within the two parties: given the partisan realignment, the average opinion
within partisan subgroups is now more extreme, as documented, for in-
stance, by Shapiro and Bafumi (2006). Party voters, having become more
consistent in their political preferences, are likely to convey more extreme
preferences to their party leaders. In addition, given the asymmetries in
issue alignment in the two parties, it is reasonable that voters are splitting
along party lines according to the issues that are most salient to them,
while they do not bother to adjust their (weak) preferences on the re-
maining issues (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). This, in turn, gives more
leverage to the actions of single-issue advocates and interest groups, which
tend to hold extreme positions (Brady and Han 2006; McCarty et al. 2006).
Voting, of course, is not the only way in which citizens can exercise
their political influence. In addition, some scholars have argued that,
especially in recent decades, new, individualized forms of civic partici-
pation have come to permeate large spheres of social life (Schudson 1998;
Perrin 2006). Nonetheless, the rise of new participatory forms, or even
new forms of citizenship—Schudson’s model of “monitoring citizenship”—
do not per se eliminate the impact that partisan sorting and biases in
group representation might have on the political outcome. Indeed, new
participatory forms, especially those requiring supervising and commu-
nicative capacity, might be affected by the same asymmetries that char-
acterize traditional ones.
15 We are not suggesting that rich people all think the same; in fact, they show great
variation in their partisanship (Manza and Brooks 1999; Bafumi and Shapiro 2007;
Gelman, Shor, et al. 2007; Gelman, Park, et al. 2008). We are saying that, whether
Republican or Democratic, rich people have a more coherent political agenda, making
them more capable of pushing through the system whatever issue they care about.
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To summarize, we have found that the main change in people’s attitudes
has more to do with a resorting of party labels among voters than with
greater constraint in their issue attitudes. This has occurred mostly be-
cause parties are more polarized and therefore better at sorting individuals
along ideological lines. Such partisan realignment, although it has not
induced realignment in issue preferences, does not come without conse-
quences for the political process. In fact, party polarization may have
gained momentum as party voters have become more divided. This, we
believe, is the feedback mechanism that has allowed parties to continue
to polarize and still win elections. In addition, increased issue partisanship,
in a context in which the issue constraint of the general public is extremely
low, may have had the effect of handing over greater voice to political
extremists, single-issue advocates, and wealthier and more educated cit-
izens, thus amplifying the dynamics of unequal representation.
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